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My prosthetic is a secret of my self. It hides, tucked beneath clothing, 
allowing me to pass as something that I am not, that I can never be. It is precious to 
me, it enables me, gives me mobility and an aesthetic that would cease if it was 
removed from me. Within my body schema, my prosthetic is as much a part of my 
body as my skin, blood, and organs. It is also an object of technology, a topological 
replacement of a missing body part. However, a large, un-chartered misunderstanding 
of experience separates both of these experiences. For many years, academics, artists, 
and theorists have tried to merge the two, in the process bringing forth ideas on the 
prosthetic that have seemingly removed it from the realm of disabled experience and 
into the fantastical world of the uncanny. Therefore, the question for myself, as an 
artist, is how to explore this large chasm of differing experience and draw out the 
uncanny into a world of subtle, lived understanding and visual acceptance. 
Firstly, to cross such a large chasm of understanding, one has to understand 
the differing meanings and symbolism that imbue the word “prosthetic.” In terms of 
conventional thinking, a prosthetic is an object that is attached/inserted into the body 
to replace the function of a missing or defective body part. There is little thought 
given to aesthetics or conceptual concerns: the prosthetic is a purely functional object. 
For artists and academics the prosthetic becomes a concept, an idea with which to 
explore the bounds of the human body. In the book The Prosthetic Impulse, Vivian 
Sobchack, herself a person using a prosthetic limb, talks about the difference between 
the actualised reality of wearing a prosthetic and the visualised/imagined reality of the 
able-bodied, academic, and artist:  
 . . . there are(sic) both an oppositional tension and a dynamic 
connection between the prosthetic as a topological figure and my prosthetic as 
a material but also phenomenological lived artefact – the the and the my here 
indicating differences both of kind and degree between generalisation and 
specificity, figure and ground, esthetics(sic) and pragmatics, alienation and 
incorporation, subjectivity and objectivity . . .(18) 
  
Sobchack refers to the differences between each meaning given to the prosthetic, 
illustrating the degree to which each opinion is marked by a particular subjective 
issuance of the prosthetic.  
For Sobchack, as for myself, these are issues that have to be addressed on a 
personal level. I have congenital limb deficiency: my right arm and leg are both 
shortened, and I procured a prosthetic leg and arm as a toddler. During this process of 
adjusting to and incorporating prosthetic limbs into the schema of my body, I rejected 
the prosthetic arm and accepted the prosthetic leg. At this young, tender age, I made a 
functional and aesthetic choice as to the integration of objects into or onto my body. 
In full rejection of the prosthetic arm I was rejecting not only its supposed functional 
purpose, but also its true symbol of “normalisation” of my body – the synchronisation 
of my body. The prosthetic leg, however, was accepted, not just as a functional object 
that enabled me mobility, but also on an aesthetic and phenomenological level. It has 
become an integral part of my identity. 
My own art practice, particularly over the last two years, has involved the 
photographic representation of my own body and disability. In its conceptual oeuvre, 
however, the focus has shifted away from the political implications of such work to a 
concerted interest in the relationship between my body and object, my body and 
space. In shifting this focus, my experience of my body suits a phenomenological 
approach to aesthetic representation, rather than a political/activist view, which can 
generalise the experience of disability. The relationship between my prosthetic 
(object) and my body (subject), thus becomes a natural exploration of the interaction 
between our selves and reality, reality as we perceive and understand it. This 
connection to an object outside of the body schema (or integration of the object into 
the body schema) links into Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical understandings of 
the body and perception, a theory which enables the viewer of artistic interpretations 
of the prosthetic to appreciate the interconnection of the body and prosthetic. 
Merleau-Ponty’s theories include ideas on the nature of the body and object 
incorporation, which distinctly links into the experience of the impaired body and its 
aids: “The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer 
perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope 
and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight” (165). This theory, so 
perceptive of the nature of the object/body integration experience, can be applied to 
prosthetics – particularly as the blind man’s cane can also be described as a prosthetic 
aid.1 This example of Merleau-Ponty’s reference to the encapsulation of the blind 
man’s cane into the body theoretically enables my own articulation of prosthetic 
experience, via artistic representation, aesthetically signifying the merging of 
technology and the body.    
In writing this article I must admit to a certain level of subjective conjecture, 
since to describe my experience of the prosthetic I cannot admit to knowing other 
people’s experience, due to  differing circumstances, such as the technological degree 
of the prosthetic, as well as how the person has come to the prosthetic. Therefore, to 
maintain a certain level of objective process this article will also look at three other 
people whose identities are intertwined with the prosthetic. One who has produced 
and documented the prosthetic (an example of historic representation), one with limb 
deficiency and lastly, an able-bodied artist – as a counterpoint for my own 
experiences. In the nineteenth century, James Gillingham’s ingenuity and skill 
changed the production and aesthetic of the prosthetic limb. His skill as a prosthesis 
maker and photographer allows us a glimpse into the attitudes and expectations 
towards limb deficient people from that time. Aimee Mullins is an American woman 
who had her lower legs removed at birth due to a medical condition. She is now a 
Paralympic track star as well as muse, of sorts, to artist Matthew Barney. This 
“double-life” has come to define her by her prosthetics; as for both “jobs” she has 
many varied and specialised prosthetic legs. Another woman, who, though able-
bodied, developed prosthetics within an artistic/conceptual process whilst she was 
suffering a medical condition, is Rebecca Horn. Horn, as an artist who explores the 
subtle and dreamlike land of the unconscious and its relationship to the body, explores 
the limits and extensions of the body, quietly bringing forth the uncanny. Her work 
remains largely neutral, though it does refer to certain political movements such as 
feminism. This political inference, however, does not impose on her exploration of 
her own world, agency, and identity. 
In terms of technological advances, the prosthetic limb has appeared, in some 
form or another, for thousands of years. But in relationship to my own particular 
research, I turn to the production of limbs and subsequent photography of James 
Gillingham. Gillingham’s work (circa 1870 onwards) brought about a new vision of 
the prosthetic – not just of its use and application, but of its aesthetic, the materials 
used to produce the limbs, and the concept of what a prosthetic limb could be. It is 
this conceptual thought and visual representation through Gillingham’s photography 
that not only records a momentous technological leap forward in regards to prosthetic 
limbs, but enables the patient: “to perform tasks,” and: “also improve their appearance 
and so their self esteem” (Warren, 41). This results in an articulation of a new 
aesthetic of the prosthesis.  
In Gillingham’s photographs the prosthetic limb is revealed, exposed as the 
antagonist of the image. The men stare out of the image, their prosthetic drawing the 
eye of the viewer from this confrontation to the “product” that is, in effect, being 
advertised. As for the women, their faces are commonly hidden. This variation in 
pose, their shying away from a direct confrontation with the viewer over their 
difference, can be read on multiple levels. Issues of female submissiveness and social 
roles arise, as does the exploration of identity and self; however, what is perhaps most 
poignant about the photographs is the ease with which the women raise their skirts, 
revealing not just the prosthetic, but also their flesh.2 In the era in which these 
photographs were taken, revealing the body to this extent, would have appeared 
morally dubious; but the promise of technological advancement and the improvement 
of peoples’ lives due to Gillingham’s “discoveries,” seems to counteract the outrage 
that such images would otherwise suggest. The act of covering the women’s faces 
thus seems to indicate a delicacy to protect the women’s identity and modesty.  
Given the historic context of Gillingham’s photographs, how does his 
aesthetic translate into contemporary representations of (in particular) the woman’s 
body and the prosthetic? Firstly, I would like to confront the “disabled” woman and 
the representation of the prosthetic, as explored in Sobchack’s The Prosthetic 
Impulse. Sobchack refers to Paralympic athlete Aimee Mullins for differing visual 
representations of the disabled woman and prosthetic. Well known for her 
achievements and aesthetic representations, due to her career as an athlete, model, and 
part time muse for artist Matthew Barney, Aimee Mullins has become defined by 
what has enabled her to achieve a level of aesthetic interest: her prosthetic legs. 
Depending on her role at the time, her prosthetic legs become a symbol of that role, 
explaining to the public what her actions and motives will be at that particular point in 
time. If she is wearing her “Cheetah” legs, she is about to spring into action; if she is 
wearing her “Cinderella” legs, she is fulfilling an artistic aesthetic to do with 
imagined beauty and fragile perfection. In both examples a fantastical representation 
of the uncanny prosthetic is revealed. 
As Aimee Mullins has incorporated prosthetics into her body schema from 
early childhood, so have I, though perhaps not with the technological or aesthetic 
advantage that she has enjoyed. I have had to make do with whatever could be 
provided for me. In terms of technological advancement, my prosthetic leg is neither 
“cutting edge,” nor aesthetically pleasing. Yet, my mind and my body feel that it is 
“my” leg. It is this particular relationship between the prosthetic and the body that 
interests me – why and how does this phenomenon of object integration happen? And 
how does this body/object interaction affect my identity? 
Considering my own relationship with my prosthetic from a 
phenomenological consideration of the prosthetic within artistic representation, it 
seems pertinent to talk about Mullins’ relationship with her prosthetic as artists’ muse. 
In Mathew Barney’s Cremaster Cycle 3 (2002), Mullins comes to represent an 
idealised other, symbolised by the variety of prosthetics that she wears, prosthetics 
that seem to envelop her identity within a certain fetishising articulation. By this, I 
refer to characters that she comes to represent through the narrative of her prosthetics 
– the “Cinderella” glass legs, and the “Cheetah” animal legs. Technological advances 
as well as aesthetic considerations forefront her role in Barney’s films, she becomes 
the putty with which the ideal (or un-ideal) woman is moulded. However, it appears 
that the desire for the “perfect” woman’s legs is particularly a goal for Mullins, and 
not necessarily Barney, for it is Mullins herself who often talks about her “perfect” 
legs (prosthetic legs that resemble a Barbie doll’s, slim, smooth, and with perfect 
arches for high heeled shoes). For Mullins, it is participation through Barney’s films 
that allows a certain fulfilment of this goal however, in the process of wearing the 
“perfect” legs, she comes to embody the “perfect” legs and hence the “perfect” 
woman.  
By becoming her prosthetic limbs, Mullins’ identity is so entwined with what 
they have come to represent: a mask behind which she can shield her “true” self. 
Mullins has stated that: “to be without prosthetic limbs is to be exposed, to be laid 
bare . . .”(Smith, 66). This reveals an interdependence between the prosthetic and 
herself: she gives her prosthetic limbs life and they provide her with protection 
against the aesthetic “differences” which her impairment creates. I believe that it is 
this rather complex relationship that is explored by Barney in the artistic 
representation of Mullins and her prosthetics.  
In regards to Barney’s Cremaster Cycle 3 (2002), Mullins’ characterisations 
are dominated by the identity of the prosthetics. Her prosthetics are “obvious,” but 
only in the way that they affect the mobility of her body. We first see Mullins in the 
role of “Cheetah Woman.” The camera pans her body, the large cheetah legs 
dominating the screen; Mullins’ movements seem difficult and stilted, even as she lies 
like a cheetah, gazing at Barney as he makes his way past her. This lack of motility as 
a “Cheetah woman,” directly contrasts with Mullins’ usual association with the term 
“Cheetah” (the legs that she uses for racing – and thus enabler of extreme physical 
movement, are called “Cheetah Legs”).  
In her next Cremaster Cycle 3 (2002) role, she walks on “glass legs,” 
indicative of the fragile relationship between the body and the prosthetic.3 She may be 
walking on “perfect legs,” however, again her movements are awkward and difficult; 
it looks as though at any moment her prosthesis will betray her, will cause her to fall 
and expose herself as what she really is. In this sense, whilst Mullins is “other” due to 
the prosthetics, she will doubly be revealed as “other” if the prosthetics are removed – 
with the prosthetics she can pretend to be “normal,” but she never will be. It is this 
fragility in the relationship between the body and the prosthetic that reveals the 
inherent and utterly intimate nature that is required in the body/object relationship. 
This intimate nature is particularly apparent in the amputee/prosthetic relationship, 
due to the symbiotic connection between the body and object. The object requires the 
body for it to become animated, the body requires the prosthetic to negotiate the space 
it moves through. This body/object relationship also questions Merleau-Ponty’s 
assertion about the “inclusive” nature of the body, and begs the question: how 
connected is Mullins to her prosthetic legs as part of her body schema?  
This question can be answered with reference to the relationship 
encompassing the connection between consciousness and the body. To what extent 
are we aware of the body and the connection to inanimate objects that we attach to it? 
Mullins and Barney explore the extent of identity formation that involves the 
prosthetic, but in doing so also expose the technological advances made within the 
realm of prosthesis, which can ascertain a particular aesthetic, but prove 
uncomfortable in its locomotive action. However, to answer the previous question, 
one needs to consider the relationship between the prosthetic and the body as 
phenomena. One particular artist who subtly observes the phenomena of the body’s 
relationship with the object is Rebecca Horn, whose work encompasses a multi-media 
approach to understanding this interchange. 
Horn’s particular use and understanding of the prosthetic was brought about 
by her need to create bodily extensions that enabled her when severely limited by 
temporary physical disability. Therefore, the direction of her art practice became 
about the extension of the body, the perceived limitations of the body, and the ways in 
which the artist interprets this relationship. Horn’s creation of bodily extensions 
continued to inform her work, even after her convalescence, as her understanding of 
her body came to reflect a more phenomenological approach. Phenomenology, as 
described in Pollio’s The Phenomenology of Everyday Life, is “a relationship between 
people and their world, whether the world at that moment consists of other people, 
nature, time, one’s own body, personal or philosophical idea, or whatever”(4-5). For 
Horn, her art practice defines and describes her experiences as she perceives the 
events; this is particularly evident in her earlier work, which included body sculptures 
and performance. 
If Horn’s works are essentially phenomenological in nature and thus reflect 
the perceptual relationship between the body and the mind, it would appear that her 
work also makes a comment on the fragility of the body and the mind. It is the 
phenomena of the mind and body as a whole entity that experiences the world through 
a subtle arrangement of sensation and perception that Horn presents via her 
interpretation of the prosthetic. Emotionally, her work reads of an alienation of the 
“self” into the “other,” evident by the beautiful movements evoked by her body 
sculptures, particularly when performed. This is in contrast to Mullins, whose 
awkward movements via her “useful” prosthetics, seem to indicate the prosthetics’ 
totality over the body. It is this difference of body/object integration that reflects 
either a fetishist experience of the prosthetic or the prosthetic representing the 
uncanny.4 Mullins’ prosthetics and their totality over her body certainly speak of a 
highly controlling relationship with her identity, whilst Horn’s prosthetics seamlessly 
merge with the body, emphasising the sensuality and unpredictability of the 
experience.  
In this respect, the reaction to the prosthetic is also affected by its level of 
technological construction; Mullins’ prosthetics are created with technological 
advances and materials, which presupposes an easier interaction and acceptance of 
such an object with the body. However, it has been suggested that for Mullins’ legs to 
work properly she must maintain a certain level of momentum; she can never be “just 
still.” With Horn’s “bodysculptures,” basic materials are used to create elegant, easily 
integrated, bodily extensions that speak more of “self” extending into object, than 
object extending onto “self.” An example of this within Horn’s work is her most well 
known “bodysculpture,” and film, Einhorn (Unicorn) (1970-1972). This film 
represents a subtle relationship between the performer and the prosthetic (in this case 
a unicorn’s horn, strapped delicately to the body by thin, soft white straps). This 
relationship reflects a seamless coming together of prosthetic object and the body. 
The viewer ceases to see the object and subject as “different” to each other, instead, 
the fantastical becomes the possible, the uncanny is revealed. Difference becomes the 
aesthetic outcome of the relationship, proving that that which is “uncanny,” that 
which is truly strange, is most desired. Therefore, in creating such a relationship via 
prosthetics that fail to have any purpose outside of their intended artistic use, the body 
and the prosthetic become one, and the phenomenological nature of the relationship is 
complete. 
As an artist whose concern is to comprehend the rather tenuous and loaded 
relationship between my body and my prosthetic, I must consider both representations 
of the prosthetic, as technological advance and artistic device. However, in doing so, 
on a cultural and social level, the prosthetic must be talked about, acknowledged, and 
accepted as an experiential condition of understanding. What do I mean by this? Well, 
as stated in the opening paragraph, my prosthetic is a secret of myself – I experience it 
and therefore I must describe it, by whatever means suit. Just as Aimee Mullins has 
her own lived-experience with her prosthetics, she describes her experience via her 
sporting pursuits and involvement in Barneys’ films. Nonetheless, it is this form of 
description that is called into question by two able-bodied interactions with 
prosthetics: Gillingham and Horn. I feel that Gillingham’s rather blatant exposure of 
the prosthetic, rather like Mullins’, reveals the process of prosthetic “take-over” of the 
body. Their images, unlike Horns’, represent a need to be known by the prosthetic, 
both technologically and aesthetically.  
Through artistic prosthetic creation – without the absolute reliance on 
technological advances – Horn’s interaction with the prosthetic, and hence, 
explanation of the prosthetic, seems more in line with my own understanding and 
experiences. It is this phenomenological approach to understanding of the world that I 
wish to apply to my own understanding of my prosthesis. As Sobchack implies, the 
prosthetic, for the wearer, only comes into consciousness when it is “pushed to the 
foreground,” i.e., when I am faced with certain terrain or stairs, my manoeuvrability 
becomes limited by the prosthetic. However, for Mullins, where her identity is so 
engulfed by her prosthetic legs, there is no opportunity for them to be “pushed to the 
foreground,” for they are always in the foreground, always visually exposed (Smith, 
22-23).  
As a technological advance, the prosthetic provides the wearer with a means 
of mobility, a means of “passing” through this world as something that they are not, 
and an aesthetic that conjures re-imaginings of the human body. However, people that 
wear the prosthetic often become defined by it, their experience of the prosthetic is 
presumed. It is at this juncture that perhaps, as humans, we must consider a softer, 
subtler approach to understanding what the prosthetic has come to mean within a 
broader scope. It is possible to understand this broader meaning of the prosthetic as 
long as artists and academics continue to question its role with the body and the 
responses that it invokes from the observer – a question that imbues my own artistic 
and life practice.    
                                                 
1  This is based on an understanding of impairment and “aids” that remove the impairment or 
enable the impaired person to negotiate the world they are in, such as a blind man’s cane or a prosthetic 
limb – which relates to my own spatial experience and bodily integration of my prosthetic leg. 
2  These implications would involve other theories, including feminism, which are not 
mentioned within the article. 
3  This impression of Matthew Barney’s film The Cremaster Cycle 3, cannot be considered as a 
complete understanding of the work, as, due to the expanse of all of the films, I have only viewed 
portions of the entire work. I simply make this judgement and understanding of Mullins role in the 
films from what I have viewed. 
4  The online Cambridge Dictionary describe Fetish and uncanny as – 
 Fetish (noun) 1. a sexual interest in an object or part of the body other than the sexual 
organs 
 Uncanny (adjective). Strange or mysterious; difficult or impossible to explain 
 http://dictionary.cambridge.org 
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